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Highlights:  
 A proposed test for ex ante moral hazard in automobile insurance is evaluated.   
 The co-existence of moral hazard and familial correlation can produce ambiguous results. 
 Parent’s bonus malus is likely, an element of the insurer’s information set, for the adult child.  
 The proposed test fails the technical requirements of a natural experiment. 
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 Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance 
Markets: A test for ex ante moral hazard revisited 
 
Background 
In their influential paper, “Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets” 
Chiappori and Salanié (2000), proposed a test for asymmetric information using a French 
insurance claims data set, which contained a rich set of controls for the insurer’s information 
set. In France, the insurer's information set includes the bonus-malus, which is an index that 
reflects automobile crash history. A bivariate probit model was specified wherein the first 
probit predicts the level of insurance and the second probit predicts the occurrence of a claim. 
The null hypothesis of no asymmetric information was tested with two parametric tests of the 
following hypotheses: (i) H0: cov (  ,  ) = 0 when the two probits are estimated separately 
and (ii) H0:   = 0 when the model is estimated as a bivariate probit. To control for the 
potentially confounding effects of adverse selection, the analysis was limited to a sub-
population of beginner drivers. No evidence of asymmetric information was found.  
Chiappori and Salanié (2000 p.72) then specified a test for moral hazard, which exploited 
“...a kind of natural experiment...” the authors identified. The authors argue that, in France, a 
beginner driver can ‘inherit’ their parent's bonus-malus coefficient if they declare that their 
car is jointly-owned with their parents. The minimum bonus-malus index, which indicates a 
safe driver, is 0.5. They construct a dichotomous variable. The inherited bonus-malus (IBM) 
is equal to one if the beginner driver inherits a bonus-malus coefficient of 0.5 from their 
parent and zero if otherwise. This binary variable IBM is added to the Insurance and Claims 
probit models. They argue that two processes, moral hazard and familial correlation, enable 
the sign on the coefficient for IBM in the Claims model to be utilized to test for ex ante moral 
hazard, as follows (the bold fonts are our emphasis): 
Three possible stories can be considered: (1) ...parents' performances are positively 
correlated with the child's. Then the 50 percent bonus signals a better driver and 
should be negatively correlated with accident probability. (2) ...the parents' 
performances are uncorrelated with the child's, and there is no moral hazard. Then the 
50 percent bonus is allocated randomly and should not matter for accident 
probabilities. (3) Finally, assume that parents' and child's performances are 
uncorrelated but there is some moral hazard. Then we are facing a kind of natural 
experiment, as some drivers face a different incentive scheme for exogenous reasons. 
Since the marginal cost (to the insured) of an accident is increasing with the bonus 
coefficient, one should expect that a lower bonus coefficient decreases incentives and 
thus leads to larger accident probabilities. (Chiappori and Salanié, 2000 pp. 71-72) 
Moreover, the results from this test for ex ante moral hazard continue to be promulgated and 
in 2013 were represented in the Handbook of Insurance as a quasi-natural experiment. 
(Chiappori, 2103) 
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Potentially there are two concerns with this test for moral hazard. The first is analytical and 
relates to the claim that the two countervailing hypotheses, moral hazard and familial 
correlation produce three unambiguous effects on the sign on the IBM coefficient (α IMB). In 
Table 1 we construct a two-by-two matrix of all possible interactions between familial 
correlation and moral hazard to demonstrate that there are in fact four possible effects 
combinations, not three. Cells 1, 2 and 3 correspond respectively to the Options 2, 3 and 1 as 
hypothesized by Chiappori and Salanié (2000 pp. 71-72). However, the net effect identified 
in Cell 4 is ambiguous and could correspond to the outcome of cells 1, 2 or 3 if the magnitude 
of familial correlation is equal to, less than or greater than that of moral hazard, respectively.  
Table 1: The effects of familial correlation and moral hazard on probability of a claim 
  
Nil Moral Hazard (MH0 )  Nil Moral Hazard (MH0 )  
Nil Familial Correlation 
(FC0) Cell 1 Cell 2 
 
MH: Nil correlation MH: Nil correlation  
 
Net: Nil correlation Net:  Positive correlation 
Familial Correlation (FC1 )  Cell 3 Cell 3 
 
MH: Nil correlation MH: Positive correlation 
 
FC: Negative correlation FC: Negative correlation 
  Net: Negative correlation Net:  Ambiguous correlation 
 
A second concern relates to the implicit assumption that the variable IBM was collected, but 
not used, by insurers to risk rate potential policyholders. Chiappori and Salanié (2000) 
proposed that the variable IBM be excluded from the insurer’s information set for conducting 
a natural experiment. However a natural experiment is typically understood as having 
occurred “...when some (often unintended) feature of the setup we are studying produces 
exogenous variation in an otherwise endogenous explanatory variable (Wooldridge, 2002 p. 
88). Contrary to the assertion that the drivers “...face a different incentive scheme for 
exogenous reasons” (Chiappori and Salanié, 2000 p. 72), there are two plausible reasons why 
the allocation of the IBM is endogenous and its coefficient negatively correlated with a claim. 
First, as hypothesized by (Chiappori and Salanié, 2000), driving skills may be inherited. 
Second, beginner drivers who operate a jointly owned vehicle may have an additional 
incentive to exercise preventive effort. The alternative is to assume that young drivers are 
indifferent between crashing a personal and family car. 
We contend that the IBM is an element of insurer's conditioning set. First, French insurers are 
observed to collect the parent's bonus-malus. Second, Chiappori and Salanié (2000 p. 71) 
reported French insurers use it to price the adult child's insurance premium. Third, the test for 
“moral hazard” confirms that IBM is negatively correlated with a claim (Chiappori and 
Salanié, 2000 p. 72). Thus, the evidence suggests that the IBM is used to risk rate potential 
policyholders and therefore fails the technical requirements of a natural experiment. 
Conclusion 
We hope that by drawing attention to these issues, other economists may be assisted in the 
difficult and ongoing task of differentiating ex ante moral hazard and adverse selection 
empirically. 
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